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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of
the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economy-
wide welfare aﬀects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in a
mixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-
Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after
a privatization, with or without eﬃciency gains. This can be true both in
terms of welfare and of public firm’s profit.
When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed-
Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of
sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that the
market performance with an ineﬃcient public firm is better than the one
implemented after a full-eﬃcient privatization. Absent eﬃciency gains,
privatization always lowers welfare.
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1 Introduction.
Starting from the second half of the last century we measure an increasing
interest by economic theory for the role played by a non-monopolistic public
firm that competes with private-owned ones. The presence of public firms in
oligopolist market characterized several industries in continental Europe, UK,
North America as well as developing countries all over the world. In 1984 state-
owned enterprises accounted for 8.5% of the GDP in industrialized countries
(Sheshinski and López-Calva, 1999 ).
Despite the structure of any industry, in general the presence of a public
firm can be used as a policy instrument to improve resource allocation in any
imperfectly competitive market. Moreover, merit goods or products and ser-
vices which confer significant positive externalities, such as housing, education,
health, pensions, are often provided by the public together with the private
sector. Sometimes the strategic importance of some activities, such as banking,
transportation, military production has justified nationalization of some, if not
all, firms in the industry. In some cases the government has stepped in to res-
cue a failing firm to maintain employment or to create "national champions" in
strategic, especially technologically advanced, sectors (Anderson et al., 1997 ).
Conversely, starting from the eighties a vast process of privatization and
liberalization has characterized the industrialized economies and soon was ex-
tended to developing and former socialist countries. The size of state sector
shrank rapidly and reached the 5% of GDP in 2000 (Meggison and Netter,
2001 ). The motivations for this program were essentially linked to the general
perception of poor performance of public firms and to the idea that private
discipline and profit motivation could enhance eﬃciency.1
However, empirical findings are more ambiguous in this respect.2 Most of
the works report an increase in profitability after the privatization, but the
evidence of productive eﬃciency improvements is less clear and the variance of
the results is substantial (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000 ). Besides, the allocative
eﬃciency eﬀect is even more puzzling since there is not a general evidence of
positive welfare eﬀects of privatization.3
1Theoretical support was provided by the theory of incentives that demonstrated how
agency problems in state-owned enterprises can cause larger ineﬃciencies than in private-
owned firms. In fact, profit maximizing owners subject to threats of bankruptcy and takeover
have stronger incentives to reduce costs than politicians or bureaucrats. They would motivate
and monitor appointed managers more eﬃciently than when there are wider and sometimes
distorted objectives, soft budget constraints and complicated chains of command (Gadal and
Shirley, 1995 ). In addition, Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) presents the "fundamental priva-
tization theorem" (analogously to the fundamental theorem of welfare economics) providing
conditions under which government production cannot improve upon private production.
2 See for example the metareviews of Villalonga, 2000 ; Meggison and Netter, 2001 ; Will-
ner, 2001; that report the results of hundreds of empirical papers on privatization.
3Also modern theory is less dogmatic on ownership (see Estrin and Pérotin, 1991 ). For
example, an owner-manager would indeed have strong incentives to cut costs. But to privatize
a managerial firm may increase costs, because the profit motive reduces the incentive to pay
for lower managerial slack (de Fraja, 1993; Willner 2003 ). Public ownership may in some
models mean excessive labour intensity and private ownership the opposite, with ambiguous
consequences for overall productivity (see Pint, 1991 ). The ranking of ownership is sentive
2
Actually, privatization processes have reduced the public sector in general,
and the presence of public firm in oligopolistic markets in particular. Neverthe-
less, liberalization processes have opened previous state controlled monopolies
to competition of the private sector without full privatization; evidences occur
in water, transportation, telecommunications and energy industries. For exam-
ple, in spite of regulating a privatized monopoly, governments could enforced a
facility-based competitions in order to achieve a so-called dynamic eﬃciency4.
As a consequence, we face many mixed oligopoly where public firms (often the
former monopolists) compete with private ones.
The aim of early theoretical works on mixed oligopoly has been to analyze
whether it is possible to reduce the allocative ineﬃciency raised by imperfect
competition, through the use of a public firm as an internal regulation mecha-
nism. One of the first articles is Merrill and Schneider (1966), where the mixed
oligopoly setting is defined as the "fourth way" of industry control and property
assessments5. Under symmetry constant return to scale and industry capacity
constraints, it proves that the presence of a public firm, facing a joint (collu-
sive) oligopoly, can improve welfare guaranteeing a lower equilibrium price, an
higher total output, positive profits for any firms, and that the demand does
not exceed the industry total capacity. Similar results are obtained in Harris
and Wiens (1980), where it is examined how a government enterprise could
be used to promote static economic eﬃciency within a imperfectly competitive
market structure. This is true when policy instruments are limited to the set
of variables under the control of the government-owned firm. It considers a
quantity competition among firms with increasing marginal costs. The setting
is characterized by a strange "dominant" public firm that announces its output
strategy, i.e. to produce the diﬀerence between the socially optimal output and
the private one.6
Hagen (1979), Rees (1984) and Bös (1986) extended the result of the second
best literature to the mixed oligopoly framework and prove that, in an imper-
fectly competitive market, a public firm should depart from the marginal cost
pricing rules in order to maximize social welfare. The optimal departure im-
plies that the public firm plays as Stackelberg leader. In Beato and Mas-Colell
(1984), the analysis involves a duopoly quantity competition in an industry
characterized by increasing marginal costs. It gives new strength to the mar-
ginal cost pricing rule by reversing the role of the firms with respect to what is
to details in the objective function and reward schedule if low performance means that the
manager is fired (Willner and Parker, 2003 ). Also, privatization often requires regulation,
and hence an additional agency problem that may sometimes cost more than public ownership
(Shapiro and Willing 1990; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991 ).
4For deeper viewpoints on the role played by facility-based competition in EU and
US Telecommunications liberalization and regulation processes see Taschdjian (1997) or
Stehmann and Borthwick (1994).
5They consider that an industry structure can be characterized by (i) public properties and
controls; (ii) private properties and controls; (iii) private properties but constrained controls by
regulation and antitrust, (IV) public and private firms that compete, i.e. the mixed oligopoly.
6Actually, the public leader plays as a Stackelberg follower that maximizes industry-wide
welfare.
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assumed in the second best literature. In fact, the authors provide conditions
so that welfare is higher when public firm plays as follower than when it plays
as leader.
In Cremer et al. (1989) the public firm is explicitly viewed as an instrument
for regulating an oligopolistic market: they analyze the case of an n-firm quantity
competition in a simultaneous setting. They find conditions under which it
is social improving to nationalize one or more private firms, assuming that
public firms will act as consumer surplus maximizer and its budget constraint is
always binding.7 They conclude that the nationalization of at least one private
firm is always welfare improving. Garvie and Ware (1996) obtain the same
policy implications in the case of cost uncertainty, i.e. private but correlated
information about industry costs.8
All these works consider that the public firm does not play as a profit maxi-
mizer but its objective function is represented either by the consumer surplus, or
by the industry total output, or by the utilitarian measure of the industry-wide
welfare. However, given the strategical interaction, the best way to maximize
welfare in oligopoly may be that public firm maximizes something diﬀerent. In
de Fraja and Delbono (1989) is shown that at Nash equilibria social welfare
may be higher when the public firm is instructed to maximize profits rather
than welfare. In particular they study the case of an n+1 oligopoly composed
by a public firm and n profit maximizer private competitors9. They conclude
that nationalization is always socially better than public leadership, which is
in turn socially better than Cournot-Nash. But, when public leadership is not
implementable, if n is high enough, it would be better that public firm maximize
profits rather than welfare. The powerful extension of these results is that with-
out any eﬃciency gain privatizing the public firm can be welfare improving. The
same result can be found in Haskel and Sanchis (1995) where in presence of X-
ineﬃciency and a process of workers’ eﬀort bargaining between union and firms,
privatization could achieve eﬃcient wage levels. More generally, in literature
privatization is considered as a solution of the so-called no-market failures.
More recent works focus on manipulation of the public firm’s objective func-
tion. For example, dealing with partial privatization, in Fershman (1990) the
reaction function of the public firm is "a compromise", i.e. a linear combination,
between the reaction function of a profit maximizer with the one of a welfare
7 In particular, they consider that firms produce a commodity and all of them are character-
ized by constant marginal costs and fixed costs. Even though the public firm is characterized
by an higher marginal cost, this is not a case of X-ineﬃciency since the diﬀerential is treated
as a neutral transfer from government to workers.
8However, when cost diﬀerential between public and private firms is too large or demand
for a product is too weak, the mixed oligopoly setting could be welfare inferior to a private
oligopoly.
9They assume a quantity competition for a commodity, in a complete information context.
All firms are symmetric, characterized by an increasing marginal cost, no fixed cost and no
capacity constraints are considered. These assumptions allow the presence of a finite number
of small competitors. They exploit only private symmetric equilibria comparing the firm and
industry performance in the case of (i) public leadership (ii) public nationalization of the
industry (iii) mixed Nash competition, i.e. public firm maximize industry-wide welfare; (iv)
privatization, i.e. Cournot Nash competition.
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maximizer. In Matsumura (1998) the public firm is assumed to maximized
the weighted average of payoﬀ of the government, i.e. a linear combination
between welfare and consumer surplus, and its own profit. The weights are
strictly correlated with the share-holding owned by the government. In a easier
way, in Claude and Hindriks (2005), the objective function is directly a convex
combination of welfare and profit, where the endogenous weights derive from
the degree of privatization. Moreover, in White (2002) it is demonstrated how
the government can maximize its true objective by assigning the public firm a
diﬀerent objective function.10
Our paper deals with a mixed duopoly where a private and a public firm are
involved in a homogeneous good quantity competition. Since we refer to former
public monopoly opened to competition, we consider firms characterized by in-
creasing returns to scale (with fixed and constant marginal costs). In particular,
the public firm is assumed to be less ineﬃcient than its private competitor, but,
diﬀerently from Cremer et al. (1989), the public firm’s higher cost is not a
neutral transfer from firm to workers belonging to the same economy but, as
an X−ineﬃciency, it reduces any utilitarian measure of welfare. We derive the
mixed oligopoly equilibria and define conditions under which a privatization,
with or without eﬃciency gains, leads to a reduction of allocative eﬃciency and
profitability.
The novel contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, we characterize the objective of the public firm taking into account
the shadow cost of public funds as initially analyzed in Meade (1944) and ex-
ploited in Laﬀont and Tirole (1986,1993). Usually this analysis has been used
to characterize public monopolies running a deficit.
[M]any public enterprises are natural monopolies, i.e. firms that
exhibit increasing returns to scale. Once it has been proved desirable
to run such an enterprise at all, its product should be priced at
marginal cost provided the resulting deficit can be financed through
lump-sum taxes. If there are not lump-sum, discrepancies between
consumer and producer taxes will result in ineﬃciencies in the rest of
the economy. (...) This has been taken as an argument for requiring
the public enterprise to cover, by its own means, at least part of its
deficit. (Marchand et al., 1984 )
Here we apply the same reasoning to a public firm competing in an oligopoly.
In our framework, with fixed cost and constant marginal cost, the idea is that
public firm’s profit — whether positive or negative — have to be considered as a
(positive or negative) transfer from the government to the public firm. In fact,
when public firm deficit occurs, government must resort to distortionary taxes
on income, capital or consumption. If government rises 1 Euro, society pays
10All the previous articles consider markets for commodities. Mixed oligopolies with dif-
ferentiated products are analized in Cremer et al. (1991), Grilo (1994) and Anderson et al.
(1997).
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(1+λ) Euro. Consequently, public profits, when positive, avoid an equivalent
public transfer, reducing distortionary taxes. Public firm’s profit and deficit are
not a neutral transfer among agents of the same economy. They ought not to
be weighted as private firm’s profits or consumer net surplus in the utilitarian
measure of welfare, but they should be weighted 1+λ. Even though there is
no general agreement on the objective of the public firm (Vickers and Yarrow,
1991 ), we believe that our proposal, in a partial equilibrium setting meets the
intuition of Marchand et al. (1984). Moreover, there is large empirical evidence
of prices above marginal cost with soft budget constraint and also positive profits
by public firm, where the latter occurs more frequently in the mixed oligopoly
context than in natural public monopolies. Thus, we do not require the public
firm to act under hard budget constraint and the profit will be positive or
negative depending on the importance of the distortion due to taxation and the
amount of fixed costs.
Second, after having analyzed the simultaneous moving game, we consider
the issue of endogenizing the timing of competition; that is, the order of play in
a given two player game. It is worth noting that in Harris and Wiens (1980),
Beato and Mas-Colell (1984), Cremer et al. (1989) and de Fraja and Delbono
(1989), the choice of the timing of competition (either Nash-Cournot or Stackel-
berg) is exogenously given. On the contrary, the determination of simultaneous
(Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games and the assignment of
leader and follower roles should be the result of preplay independent and simul-
taneous decisions by the players.
To endogenize the timing of the game, we apply the Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) model to our framework. In their insightful paper, the authors con-
struct an extended game adding to the basic game a preplay stage at which
players simultaneously and independently decide whether to move early or late
in the basic game. Then, the basic game is played according to these timing
decisions: if both players decide to move at the same time, simultaneous play
endogenously arises; while sequential play — with the order of moves as decided
by players — otherwise. As a consequence, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
of the extended game induce an endogenous sequencing of moves in the basic
game. Hamilton and Slutsky refer to it as a game with observable delay since
both players choose the action in the basic game after having observed the time
decision of the other. Amir and Grilo (1999) apply this model to a private
duopoly showing that, in a quantity setting with strategic substitutability, the
simultaneous game emerges as the endogenous timing and the Cournot equilib-
rium as the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the extended game. Pal
(1998) addresses the issue of endogenous order of moves in a mixed oligopoly by
adopting the same game structure. It shows that sequential playing emerges as
the endogenous timing and both Stackelberg solutions as the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria of the extended game.
Applying the Hamilton and Slutsky’s model to our setting allows us to char-
acterize the diﬀerent equilibria emerging in a mixed market, to analyze whether
the privatization leads to a change of the endogenous timing, and to define the
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overall welfare eﬀect of privatization.
The main results of our analysis can be summed up as follows. In the
simultaneous setting:
1. There exists a parameters space such that welfare is larger when the (inef-
ficient) public firm is a welfare maximizer than after privatization. More-
over, when the shadow cost of public funds is not negligible, public firm’s
profit are larger, too. That is, there is no trade-oﬀ between welfare and
public firm’s profit.
2. The market performance with an ineﬃcient public firm may be better than
the one implemented after a full-eﬃcient privatization.
Extending the analysis to the endogenous timing:
3. Diﬀerently from Pal (1998), in our model setting either mixed-Nash,
private leadership or both Stackelberg outcomes can result as subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the endogenous timing game.
4. Absent eﬃciency gains, privatization always lowers welfare.
5. The endogenous timing setting enlarges the parameters space such that
the market performance with an ineﬃcient public firm is better than the
one implemented after a full-eﬃcient privatization.
Last results rely on the fact the presence of a public firm let sequential
equilibria be part of a SPNE of the game. Conversely, with private-owned
firms, only simultaneous equilibria can be implemented.
It is worth noting that our results are obtained under the assumption that
government has the bargaining power to extract all the rent of the privatized
firm; that is, the price paid for the former public firm is equal to the profit
gained in the new (Cournot) equilibrium. This assumption drives the results in
favor of privatization, since it overweights the revenue from privatization by λ
in any welfare comparisons.
In what follows, the next Section sets up the model. Section 3 presents the
mixed-Nash equilibrium of the game and exploits the presence or the lack of
advantages of privatization, even though full eﬃcient. Section 4 is focused on
the issue of endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly, while Section 5 is devoted to
analysis of privatization in the same framework. Our conclusions are delegated
to Section 6.
2 The theoretical model.
We consider the simplest setting of a private and a public firm, respectively
labelled with i = 1, 2, producing a homogenous commodity. Demand preferences
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are described by a linear function where intercept and slope are normalized to
one.
P (q1, q2) = 1− q1 − q2 (1)
Both firms are characterized by constant marginal costs11 , ci ≥ 0, and fixed
costs, Ki ≥ 0, sustained only in case of producing. But, while the private firm’s
marginal cost is normalized to zero, the public firm’s one is positive, equal to
c ∈
¡
0, 12
¢
. This assumption avoids the cases in which the duopoly degenerates
in a monopoly12
We adopt a static, partial equilibrium analysis and we assume complete in-
formation for all the agents. Both firms play a quantity-competition game. We
assume that public funds have a shadow cost equal to λ > 0 and that public prof-
its, when positive, avoid an equivalent public transfer, reducing distortionary
taxes. Then, we assume that the public firm does not maximize the industry-
wide welfare but, taking into account the distortionary eﬀect of the avoided
taxes, it maximizes an utilitarian measure of the economy-wide welfare.
In particular, let S(Q) denote the consumer gross surplus, where Q =P2
i=1 qi is the industry total output. P (Q) denotes the inverse demand func-
tion. In the presence of a shadow cost of public funds the utilitarian measure
of welfare is
W = S(Q)− P (Q)Q− (c1q1 +K1 − P (Q)q1)− (1 + λ)(c2q2 +K2 − P (Q)q2)
= CS(Q)− (−Π1)− (1 + λ)(−Π2)
= CS(Q) +Π1 + (1 + λ)Π2 (2)
where CS(Q) denotes the consumer net surplus.
The industry-wide welfare is
V = Π1 +Π2 +
(q1 + q2)
2
2
(3)
Then, the public firm’s objective function can be rewritten as follows.
W = V + λΠ2 (4)
where the profit levels are
Π1 = (1− q1 − q2)q1 (5)
Π2 = (1− c− q1 − q2)q2 (6)
11Although the assumption of increasing marginal cost is popular in the literature, many
mixed markets have occurred in industrial production where it would be more realistic to
assume constant marginal costs. For the papers adopting increasing marginal costs, see Beato
and Mas-Colell (1984), de Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White
(1998).; while for the papers adopting constant marginal costs, see Cremer et al. (1989) and
Martin (2004).
12 In fact, absent fixed costs, when the public firm is not less eﬃcient than the private one, the
unique equilibrium in simultaneous and sequential timing is a public monopoly. Analogously,
when the public firm is too ineﬃcient (c ≥ 1
2
), a private monopoly always arises. When we
introduce asymmetric fixed costs, a monopoly result holds again. But, its public or private
nature depends on the levels of the fixed costs.
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Function 2, or equivalently 4, is derived considering that a public transfer
occurs in order to guarantee the public firm’s budget balance. This transfer is
positive (negative) when public firm’s profits are negative (positive). Notice that
without fixed costs, our model setting guarantees always non-negative profits
for both firms. That means, the public transfer is always non-positive.
Otherwise, when there exist fixed costs, the private firm’s reaction function
ought to be truncated in the point it crosses the zero-isoprofit curve and on-
the-boundary solutions can occur in equilibrium. The public firm’s best reply,
even though public transfers guarantee the sustainability of negative profits, is
truncated. This depends on the duplication of fixed costs that occurs when
public firm produces. In fact, when its production is too small, the fixed cost
outweights the allocative benefits.
Therefore, in what follows we provide the assumptions on the admissible sets
in the parameters space.
Assumption 1. The parameters c and λ belong to the subspace A ⊂
R×R = ©(c, λ) |c ∈ ¡0, 12¢ ∨ λ ∈ £0, λ¤ª , where λ is a finite, reasonable value of
the shadow cost of public funds.
Assumption 2. The private firm’s fixed cost K1 belongs to the subspace
B ⊂ R =
£
0,K
£
, where K is the minimum among the private firm surplus
derived in any one-shot equilibrium of the model (simultaneous or sequential).
Assumption 3. The public firm’s fixed cost K2 belongs to the subspace
C ⊂ R =
h
0,K
h
, where K is lower than the allocative improvement due to the
presence of the public firm in any one-shot equilibrium of the model (simultane-
ous or sequential).
Given our model setting, the firms’ reaction functions are:
r1(q2) =
½
1
2 (1− q2) if q2 < q2
0 if q2 ≥ q2
(7)
r2(q1) =
½
1+λ
1+2λ (1− c− q1) if q1 < q1
0 if q1 ≥ q1
(8)
where
q2 ≡ q2 : Π1 (r1 (q2) , q2) = 0
q1 ≡ q1 :W (q1, r2 (q1)) =W (q1, 0)
In Figure 1, the reaction functions are depicted. Coherently with the As-
sumptions 1-3, the discontinuity occurs above the monopolistic quantity of the
rival avoiding multiple or corner equilibria.
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Figure 1: Firms’ reaction functions.
3 Simultaneous equilibria: mixed oligopoly ver-
sus privatization.
When we assume firms play simultaneously, the output levels solve the system
of the reaction functions 7 and 8. We refer to this equilibrium as a mixed-Nash
equilibrium and all the derived variables are labeled by MN. The output levels
are
qMN1 = c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
(9)
qMN2 = (1− 2c)− λ
2 (1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
(10)
Notice that when λ = 0, the public firm’s output level is computed such that
in equilibrium the price is equal to the public firm’s marginal cost. That means,
in a simultaneous mixed duopoly, the public firm implements a total output
level equal to the one derived in the case of a welfare maximizer (but ineﬃcient)
monopoly; but now the welfare is higher13. Moreover, when public firm is at
least as eﬃcient as the private one, the first best solution is implemented.
13This is because the same total output is partially produced by the more eﬃcient private
competitor.
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Increasing λ decreases the equilibrium public firm’s output level, q2, and
increases the private firm’s one, q1; then, the industry total cost decreases
enhancing technical eﬃciency. This is because the public firm’s concern for
public transfers serves as a credible commitment to decrease output under the
industry-wide welfare maximizing level. Moreover, since the reaction functions
are contractions, the market output level, Q = q1 + q2, decreases and the price
increases. It is obvious that the eﬀect on consumer surplus is negative, raising
in this way the allocative ineﬃciency. There exists a clear trade oﬀ between
technical and allocative eﬃciency, and the net eﬀect on industry-wide welfare is
ambiguous. In fact, the net surplus generated in the market is
VMN =
¡
6λ− 2c− 10cλ+ 3c2 + 8λ2 − 8cλ2 + 14c2λ+ 11c2λ2 + 1
¢
2 (3λ+ 1)2
−K1 −K2
where only if
λ ≤ eλ = c
1− 5c
the industry-wide welfare increase with λ, i.e.
∂V
∂λ
= (c− λ+ 5cλ) (1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)3
≥ 0
Given c, the industry-wide welfare presents a inverse U-shape as λ increases;
raising c, the threshold value eλ such that VMN is maximal becomes larger.
The next step of the analysis is a comparative statics exercise involving
privatization. In fact, if we consider the case in which the public firm is sold
to a private management that uses the same technology, i.e. no eﬃciency gain
by privatization occurs, then the new firm will play as a profit maximizer and
the implemented equilibrium is à la Cournot. We prove that, under our model
setting, even if the government has the bargaining power to extract all the rent
from the buyer14 , the industry-wide and the economy-wide measures of welfare
may be lower after the privatization. A similar result holds when we introduce
the case of a fully eﬃcient privatization. That is, the privatized firm achieves the
same eﬃciency level of its competitor. In Table 1 we present quantities, profits
and welfare in the cases of mixed Nash (MN), privatization without eﬃciency
gains (CN), and fully eﬃcient privatization (FE).
The following theorems hold15.
Theorem 1 Introducing the shadow cost of the public funds λ, there exists a
subspace
H =
n
(c, λ)|c ≤ c∗ = 4λ+6λ2+1
26λ+12λ2+8
o
⊆ A
14That means the latter pays for the public firm a price equal to Cournot profits. This
assumption drives the results in favor of privatization, since it overweights the revenue from
privatization by λ in any welfare comparisons.
15Proofs are omitted since theorems come from comparisons of values presented in Table 1.
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q1 q2 Π1 Π2
MN c+ λ 1−2c3λ+1 (1 + λ)
1−2c
3λ+1
³
c+λ(1+c)
3λ+1
´2
−K1 (λ+ 1)λ
³
1−2c
3λ+1
´2
−K2
CN 1+c3
1
3 (1− 2c)
¡
1
3c+
1
3
¢2 −K1 ¡23c− 13¢2 −K2
FE 13
1
3
1
9 −K1
1
9 −K2
W
MN (
6λ−2c−10cλ+3c2+10λ2+2λ3−16cλ2+14c2λ−8cλ3+19c2λ2+8c2λ3+1)
2(3λ+1)2
−K1 −K2
CN 118
¡
2λ+ 11c2 + 8− 8c (1 + λ− cλ)
¢
−K1 −K2
FE 19 (λ+ 4)−K1 −K2
Table 1: The equilibrium values of quantities, profits and welfare in the cases
of mixed oligopoly (MN), privatization with no eﬃciency gain (CN) and full
eﬃcient privatization (FE).
such that the economy-wide welfare is larger with a public firm playing as an
economy-wide welfare maximizer than with an (ineﬃcient) privatized firm, i.e.,
WMN ≥WCN .
Moreover, there may not exist a trade oﬀ between welfare and profits as
shown by the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Introducing the shadow cost of the public funds λ, there exists a
subspace
H =
½
(c, λ)|c ≤ c∗ = 4λ+6λ2+1
26λ+12λ2+8 , λ ≥
1
3
¾
⊂ H
such that not only the economy-wide welfare but also the public firm profit in
the mixed-Nash equilibrium is larger than the one obtained by an (ineﬃcient)
privatized firm, i.e., WMN ≥WCN and ΠMN2 ≥ ΠCN2 .
In figure 2, the subspaces H and H are depicted.
Theorem 3 Introducing the shadow cost of the public funds λ, there exists a
subspace
Y = {(c, λ)|c ≤ c0} ⊆ A (11)
with c0 = 15λ+24λ
2+12λ3−
√
2
√
(4λ+3λ2+1)2(8λ+8λ2+3)+3
3(λ+1)2(8λ+3)
such that public firm’s profit level, economy-wide welfare and industry-wide wel-
fare are higher when public firm is an economy-wide welfare maximizer than
when a full eﬃcient privatization occurs.
Moreover, as before, there may not exist a trade oﬀ between welfare and
profits as shown by the following corollary.
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Figure 2: The subspaces H and H in the parameter space (c, λ).
Corollary 4 Introducing the shadow cost of the public funds λ, there exists a
subspace
Y =
½
(c, λ)|c ≤ c00, λ ≥ 1
3
¾
⊂ Y
with c00 =
?
3λ+3λ2−
√
λ+7λ2+15λ3+9λ4
?
6λ+6λ2
such that not only the economy-wide welfare but also the public firm profit in the
mixed-Nash equilibrium is larger than the one obtained by an eﬃcient privatized
firm, i.e., WMN ≥WFE and ΠMN2 ≥ ΠFE2 .
In Figure 3 we graph the subspaces Y and Y in the space of parameters
(c, λ).If we analyze the private firm’s profit the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5 Introducing the shadow cost of the public funds λ, the private com-
petitor is always better oﬀ when the public firm is privatized without eﬃciency
gains.
The intuition for the last theorem is that with an ineﬃcient privatization
the former public firm reduces its output and in the new equilibrium the private
competition end up producing more with an higher price. Starting from this
situation, if the privatization achieves eﬃciency gains the private competitor is
13
Figure 3: The subspaces Y and Y in the parameter space (c, λ).
of course worse oﬀ in the new equilibrium. Summing up the results in terms
of economy-wide welfare and firms’ profits, there exists a subspace of the para-
meters where the mixed-Nash equilibrium Pareto dominates the full-eﬃciency
one.
Corollary 6 Introducing the shadow cost of the public funds λ, there exists a
subspace
X ⊆ Y =
½
(c, λ)|λ ≥ 1
3
, c ≤ c00
¾
⊆ A
such that both public and private firms prefer the equilibrium in which public
firm maximizes a measure of the economy-wide welfare with respect the case of
full-eﬃcient privatization.
4 Endogenous timing.
In the previous section the timing of the game was exogenous and we assumed
that firms play simultaneously. In the following, we investigate how the deter-
mination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games
and the assignment of leader and follower roles in the latter case is the result
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of preplay independent and simultaneous decisions by the players.16 Then, in
order to endogenize the timing of the game, we use the game with observable
delay defined by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
In the first stage firms simultaneously and independently choose the timing of
action and then, once observing each other timing, they play the basic quantity
game. The extensive form of the extended game is represented in Figure 4. The
Figure 4: The extensive form of the extended game (Hamilton and Slutsky,
1990).
relevant equilibrium concept is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and each
player decides the timing of action according to the outcomes in the second
stage, the basic game. Of course none of the firms can choose the type of
competition by itself, but it can only eliminate some outcome. For example,
if one firm decides to move early two outcomes are possible according to the
decision of the other; only the Stackelberg outcome where this firm is follower
is ruled out by its decision.
Assuming existence and uniqueness of equilibria in each basic game, the
following Proposition summarizes the results obtained in Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) for any two-player game.
Proposition 7 Consider a two-player game for which the Nash and the two
Stackelberg equilibria exist. Given that both players prefer always to be Stack-
elberg leader than simultaneous player, the set of pure strategy subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria of the extended game is defined in the following way:
i) if for each firm Stackelberg follower’s payoﬀ is lower than the simultane-
ous player’s payoﬀ, then the unique SPNE of the extended game is the Nash
equilibrium where both firms decide to move early;
ii) if each firm’s Stackelberg follower payoﬀ is strictly larger than the simul-
taneous player’s payoﬀ, the two Stackelberg equilibria are pure strategy Nash
equilibria of the extended game;
16Notice that in formal game-theoretical terms, Stackelberg’s proposal is not to be con-
strued as a new solution concept for one-shot games, but rather as a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of a two-stage game of perfect information with exogenously given first and second
movers.
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iii) if firm i’s Stackelberg follower payoﬀ is strictly larger than the simul-
taneous player’s payoﬀ and firm j prefers to play simultaneously than to be
Stackelberg follower, the unique SPNE of the extended game is the Stackelberg
equilibrium with firm j being the leader.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition follows from Theorems II, III and IV in
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)17.
We use Proposition 7 in order to determine the endogenous timing in our
model in which existence and uniqueness of each basic game are assured by
Assumptions 1-3.
In our mixed duopoly game, we can write the normal form of the extended
game with payoﬀs resulting from equilibria in each possible basic game, as rep-
resented in Table 2.
Private Firm
Public Firm Early Late
Early WMN (.), ΠMN1 (.) WPuL(.), ΠPuL1 (.)
Late WPrL(.), ΠPrL1 (.) WMN (.), ΠMN1 (.)
Table 2: The normal form of the extended game in mixed oligopoly. MN,
PrL and PuL stay respectively for mixed-Nash, Private Leadership and Public
leadership equilibria.
In order to solve the game we need to compare the equilibrium payoﬀs in
each basic game. Since the simultaneous equilibria have already been derived
in Section 3, in what follows we derive the sequential ones.
4.1 Sequential outcomes of the mixed oligopoly.
In the following we analyze the case of (i) public leadership, i.e. when the
public firm moves first; and (ii) private leadership, i.e. when the public firm
moves second. Notice that from now we assume that K1 = K2 = 0.
Public Leadership (PuL).
By backward induction, when public firm is an economy-wide welfare maxi-
mizer and moves before its private competitor, we have to distinguish two cases.
In fact, there exists a threshold value of the marginal cost of the public firm, c,
c ≡ 2λ+ 1
4λ+ 4
17The intuition behind these results is the following. Given that firms prefer to be leader
than to be simultaneous player, if simultaneous player’s payoﬀ is higher than follower’s payoﬀ,
then this firm has a dominant strategy to move early. But if the firm prefers its follower payoﬀ
to the simultaneous player payoﬀ, it has no dominant strategy: when the other player moves
early it prefers to move late and vice versa. This reasoning explains the 3 possible results
listed in Proposition 7.
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qPuL1 q
PuL
2 ΠPuL1 ΠPuL2
c ∈ (0, c) (2c+λ+2cλ)(4λ+1)
(2λ−4c−4cλ+1)
(4λ+1)
(2c+λ+2cλ)2
(4λ+1)2
(2cλ−λ−c)(4c−2λ+4cλ−1)
(4λ+1)2
c ∈
£
c, 12
¢
1
2 0
1
4 0
WPuL
c ∈ (0, c) 12
(4λ−2c−6cλ+4c2+λ2−4cλ2+8c2λ+4c2λ2+1)
(4λ+1)
c ∈
£
c, 12
¢
3
8
Table 3: The Public Leadership (PuL) equilibrium values of quantities, profits
and welfare.
such that ∀c ∈ (0, c) the public firm produces in equilibrium. When c ∈
£
c, 12
¢
,
the public firm prefers not to produce and the private firm plays as a monopolist:
its quantity, market price, and any measure of welfare are the same of a private
monopoly. Economy-wide and industry-wide welfare are higher under private
monopoly than in any combination with a positive quantity produced by the
public firm.
Moreover, since
∀λ ≥ 0, c ∈
∙
1
4
,
1
2
¸
and
∂c
∂λ
=
1
4 (λ+ 1)2
> 0 (12)
when we introduce the shadow cost λ, increasing λ increases the upper limit of
the public firm’s marginal cost such that it produces: an higher level of public
ineﬃciency is compatible with a sequential duopoly equilibrium. In Table 3
quantities, profits and welfare in the public leadership equilibrium are summa-
rized.
Private Leadership (PrL).
Assume that private firm moves before its public competitor, that is, it
behaves as a leader in the Stackelberg game. As before, we have two diﬀerent
subgame-perfect equilibria depending on the value of c. There is a threshold
value c
c ≡ λ
3λ+ 1
(13)
such that ∀c ∈ (0, c) the public firm produces in equilibrium. More precisely,
for the private leader is optimal to choose a quantity such that the public firm’s
best response in positive. When c ∈
£
c, 12
¢
the public firm does not produce in
equilibrium and the private firm plays as a public (ineﬃcient) monopolist that
maximizes the industry-wide welfare: its quantity, as limit level, is such that
the market price is equal to the marginal cost of the public firm.18 Of course
the welfare is higher because the private competitor produces more eﬃciently.
18This is the standard case when λ = 0: the public follower can always produce the quantity
that needed to achieve this target and the best action for the private firm is directly producing
that level.
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qPrL1 q
PrL
2 ΠPrL1 ΠPrL2
c ∈ (0, c) 12
(c+λ+cλ)
λ
(λ−c−3cλ)(λ+1)
2(2λ+1)λ
1
4
(c+λ+cλ)2
(2λ+1)λ
1
4
(c−λ+3cλ)2(λ+1)
(2λ+1)2λ
c ∈
£
c, 12
¢
1− c 0 c(1− c) 0
WPrL
c ∈ (0, c) (4λ−4cλ+4c
2+8λ2+λ3−10cλ2+17c2λ−6cλ3+22c2λ2+9c2λ3)
8(2λ+1)λ
c ∈
£
c, 12
¢
1
2 −
1
2c
2
Table 4: The Private Leadership (PrL) equilibrium values of quantities, profits
and welfare.
Moreover, since
∀λ ≥ 0, c ∈
∙
0,
1
3
¸
and
∂c
∂λ
=
1
(3λ+ 1)2
> 0 (14)
when we introduce the shadow cost λ, increasing λ increases the upper limit
of the public firm’s marginal cost such that it produces: again, an higher level
of public ineﬃciency is compatible with a sequential duopoly equilibrium. In
Table 4 quantities, profits and welfare in the private leadership equilibrium are
summarized.
4.2 Endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly.
In this section we derive the endogenous timing of our extended game. To do
this, we define payoﬀ rankings needed for applying Proposition 7. In particular,
in Lemma 8 we compare the private firm’s profit under public leadership (i.e., the
follower payoﬀ) and under mixed-Nash equilibria, while in Lemma 9 we compare
the economy-wide welfare under private leadership (again the follower payoﬀ)
and mixed-Nash equilibria. It is worth noting that these Lemmas are suﬃcient.
In fact, any player always prefers to be leader than to play simultaneously, by
the property of Stackelberg equilibria. Moreover, the comparison between leader
and follower payoﬀs is useless since in this framework no firm can unilaterally
switch from one sequential equilibrium to the other: at most each player can
switch to the simultaneous one.
Lemma 8 Introducing the shadow cost of public funds λ, there exists a subspace
F1 = (c,λ) ⊆ A, such that the private firm is better oﬀ in the case of public
leadership than in the case of mixed-Nash equilibrium. In the subspace bF1 =
A− F1 the reverse is true.
Proof. Comparing values in Tables 1 and 3, it easy to check that ∀λ ≥ 0:
(i) ∀c ∈ (0, c)
ΠPuL1 −ΠMN1 > 0 ∀c ≤ c
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where
c ≡ λ
2
3λ+ 2λ2 + 1
≤ c (15)
(ii) ∀c ∈
¡
c, 12
¢
,
ΠPuL1 −ΠMN1 > 0 (16)
Thus, we define the subspace F1 = (c,λ) ⊆ A as follows.
F1 =
©
(c, λ) ⊆ A|c < cª (17)
and bF1 = ©(c, λ) ⊆ A|c ≥ cª
Lemma 9 Introducing the shadow cost of public funds λ, there exists a subspace
F2 = (c,λ) ⊆ A, such that the public firm is better oﬀ in the case of private
leadership than in the case of mixed-Nash equilibrium. bF2 = A− F2 the reverse
is true.
Proof. Comparing values in Tables 1 and 4, it easy to check that ∀λ ≥ 0:
(i) ∀c ∈ (0, c) ,
WPrL −WMN > 0 ∀c ∈
¡
c, c
¢
(18)
where19
c ≡ 3λ
2 + 7λ3
21λ+ 34λ2 + 17λ3 + 4
< c ∀λ ∈
¡
0, λ
¢
(19)
(ii) ∀c ∈
¡
c, 12
¢
,
WPrL −WMN > 0 ∀λ ∈
¡
0, λ
¢
(20)
Thus, we define the subspace F2 = (c,λ) ⊆ A as follows.
F2 =
©
(c, λ) ⊆ A|c < cª (21)
and bF2 = ©(c, λ) ⊆ A|c ≥ cª (22)
The intuition behind the previous lemma is the following. The subspace F2
is the set of parameter values such that the objective function of the public firm
19The inequality c < c holds until λ < 5.37228. Since λ is a measure of the distortion by
taxation, we are comfortable assuming that λ is lower than 5.37228.
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is increasing in the private firm’s output in the Nash equilibrium. This implies
that moving from mixed-Nash equilibrium to public leadership, the public firm’s
output decreases while the private’s one increases. It follows that the private
firm is better oﬀ. Of course, the same happens for the public firm that plays as
leader.
So, in the following theorems the diﬀerent SPNE of the extended game in
the subspace A.
Theorem 10 When (c, λ) ∈ bF2, the mixed-Nash equilibrium is the unique
SPNE of the extended game.
Proof. When (c, λ) ∈ bF1 the private firm prefers to implement the mixed-
Nash equilibrium than to play as Stackelberg follower. When (c, λ) ∈ bF2 the
public firm prefers to implement the mixed-Nash equilibrium than to play as
Stackelberg follower. Then, in the intersection space bF1 ∩ bF2, none want to
be follower. Since c < c, It follows that bF2 ⊂ bF1, then bF1 ∩ bF2 coincides
with bF2. Given that both players prefer always to be Stackelberg leader than
simultaneous player, both firms have dominant strategy to move early. Then,
the unique SPNE is mixed-Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 11 When (c, λ) ∈ bF1 ∩ F2, the unique SPNE of the extended game
is the Stackelberg outcome with the private firm as leader.
Proof. When (c, λ) ∈ bF1 the private firm prefers to implement the mixed-Nash
equilibrium than to play as Stackelberg follower. When (c, λ) ∈ F2 the public
firm prefers to play as Stackelberg follower than to implement the mixed-Nash
equilibrium. Since the private firm prefers always to be Stackelberg leader than
simultaneous player, it has dominant strategy to move first. Then, the unique
SPNE of the extended game is the Stackelberg outcome with the private firm
as leader.
Theorem 12 When (c, λ) ∈ F1, both Stackelberg outcomes are the (pure strat-
egy) SPNE of the extended game.
Proof. When (c, λ) ∈ F1 the private firm prefers to play as Stackelberg follower
than to implement the mixed-Nash equilibrium. When (c, λ) ∈ F2 the public
firm prefers to play as Stackelberg follower than to implement the mixed-Nash
equilibrium. Then, in the intersection space F1 ∩ F2, none want to play the
simultaneous game. Since c < c, It follows that F1 ⊂ F2, thenF1 ∩F2 coincides
with F1. Given that both players prefer always to be Stackelberg leader than
simultaneous player, then both Stackelberg outcomes are the (pure strategy)
SPNE of the extended game.
Figure 5 describe the three possible outcomes of the endogenous timing game
in the space of the parameters.
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Figure 5: SPNE of the endogenous timing game in the space of parameters
(λ, c).
5 Privatization with endogenous timing
Until now we have assumed the public firm to be an economy-wide welfare
maximizer. In this Section we carry out some comparisons in order to analyze
the eﬀects of privatization on welfare. As before, by privatization we consider
the case in which the public firm is sold and management is instructed by the
new owners to maximize profits. This change in ownership could also have the
eﬀect of reducing technical ineﬃciency. We consider the extreme cases in which
either no eﬃciency gain or full eﬃciency are achieved. In the first case the
privatized firm keeps the same technology as before; in the second it is able to
produce at the same marginal cost of its competitor, here normalized to zero.
In order to compare economy-wide welfare before and after the privatization,
the price paid to the government for buying the firm matters. As we are taking
into account the shadow cost of public funds, it is not indiﬀerent whether profits
are public or private, and if the government is able to raise enough money from
the privatization. The more money the government is able to raise by selling
the public firm, the higher the welfare after the privatization. In what follows
we give full bargaining power to the government; i.e., it is able to extract the
whole profit from the privatized firm.
To analyze the welfare eﬀect of privatization we have to compare the en-
dogenous timing equilibria in the mixed and in the private duopoly. In the
former case, when multiple equilibria arise, we assume the private leadership
equilibrium as the relevant outcome. In the latter case, we can apply the results
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in Amir and Grilo (1999) in order to define the equilibrium outcomes of the
endogenous timing game when two private firms compete.
Proposition 13 Consider a private duopoly quantity game with strategic sub-
stitutes. When the value of the parameters are in the admissible set A, no
Nash equilibrium lies on the boundary, i.e. no firm produces zero output. Then,
both firms prefer always to be simultaneous player than Stackelberg follower.
So, according to Proposition 7, the unique SPNE of the extended game is the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium where both firms decide to move early.
Proof. See Theorem 2.2 in Amir and Grilo (1999)
In Section 3 we have found the space of parameters’ value such that in
the simultaneous setting if the public firm maximized profits — or if it were
privatized — the economy-wide welfare would increase, absent eﬃciency gains.
In the following theorem, we obtain a (much stronger) result.
Theorem 14 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is
endogenous. A privatization that does not achieve any eﬃciency gain always
reduce economy-wide welfare.
Proof. By Theorem 10 when (c, λ) ∈ bF2, so that the Mixed-Nash is the
unique SPNE of the mixed oligopoly endogenous timing game. Comparing the
economy-wide welfare before and after the privatization, it is straightforward to
see that:
WMN > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ bF2
When (c, λ) ∈ F2, the Stackelberg outcome with the private firm as leader is
either the unique SPNE or one of the two SPNE of the extended game (see
Theorems 11 and 12). Again, comparing the economy-wide welfare before and
after the privatization we have:
WPrL > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2
The diﬀerence with the results in Section 3 is clear. When the simultaneous
play is exogenously given there is room for a welfare improving privatization
even when it does not achieve eﬃciency gains. This is no longer the case when
endogenous timing is considered: whenever welfare after the privatization is
larger than welfare in the mixed-Nash equilibrium, the latter is not the SPNE of
the endogenous timing game of the mixed oligopoly. And when the Stackelberg
outcome with private leadership is a SPNE, it is welfare superior to the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium that arise after the privatization.
Now we move to the analysis of the other extreme case: full eﬃcient priva-
tization and the following Theorem formalizes the result.
Theorem 15 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is
endogenous. In addition, assume that by privatization the firm achieves full
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eﬃciency and all the profits are extracted by the government. Then there exists
a subset of the parameter J, with Y ⊂ J, such that the privatization reduces
welfare.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we need to compare the welfare under
full eﬃcient privatization with the one derived in the proper endogenous timing
outcome of the duopoly game. We consider:(i) the case in which the mixed-Nash
is the equilibrium of the extended game; (ii). the case in which the Stackelberg
outcome is either the unique SPNE or one of the two SPNE of the extended
game, distinguishing when (iia) the public firm produces or (iib) it does not
produce.
(i) By Theorem 10, the subset bF2 contains values of (c, λ) for which the mixed-
Nash outcome is the equilibrium of the endogenous timing. By Theorem
3 ,the subset Y contains values of (c, λ) for which economy-wide welfare
in the mixed-Nash equilibrium is larger than the one achieved after a full
eﬃcient privatization. Then we identify the set J1.
J1 =
n
(c, λ) ∈ bF2 ∩ Y ⇔WMN −WFE ≥ 0o
for which an eﬃcient privatization reduces welfare when the endogenous
timing equilibrium of the mixed oligopoly game is the Mixed-Nash equi-
librium. Comparing (11) and (22), it is easy to check that J1 is not an
empty set.
(ii) By Theorems 11 and 12, when (c, λ) ∈ F2, the Stackelberg outcome with
the private firm as leader is either the unique SPNE or one of the two SPNE
of the extended game. In order to analyze this case we have to distinguish
the values of (c, λ) such that the public firm produces in equilibrium from
those for which it does not. First of all we define these sets:
F2a =
©
(c, λ)|c < c⇔ qPrL2 > 0
ª
F2b =
©
(c, λ)|c ≥ c⇔ qPrL2 = 0
ª
Then:
(iia) We compare the economic-wide welfare when the private leadership is the
SPNE of the mixed oligopoly game and the public firm produces positive
quantity; i.e., (c, λ) ∈ F2a. Comparing the values presented in Tables 1
and 4, it easy to check that there exists a set J2a ⊆ F2a such that the
privatization reduces welfare, and it is not empty.
J2a =
n
(c, λ) ∈ F2a|4λ− 7λ3 − 18cλ (1 + λ) (2 + 3λ) + 9c2 (1 + λ)2 (4 + 9λ) > 0
o
(iib) Looking at the case in which the public follower does not produce in
the SPNE; i.e., (c, λ) ∈ F2b, there exists a set J2b ⊆ F2b such that the
privatization reduces welfare, and it is not empty.
J2b =
½
(c, λ) ∈ F2b|c < 1
3
√
1− 2λ⇔WPrL −WFE ≥ 0
¾
23
Figure 6: The subset J that collect all the values of the parameters such that a
full eﬃcient privatization reduces welfare.
Finally, the subset of parameters’ values such that a full eﬃcient privatization
with full bargaining power to the government reduces economy-wide welfare is
the following.
J = J1 ∪ J2a ∪ J2b
In Figure 6 we graph the set J in the parameters’ space. It is easy to check that
Y ⊂ J .
5.1
6 Conclusions
Privatization not only can increase the eﬃciency of a market where an ineﬃ-
cient public firm competes with private-owned ones, but often it is treated as
powerful instrument to raise money. In fact, in contexts where economic poli-
cies are constrained by budget balance requirements, the prices paid for public
firms reduces the use of distortionary taxes. In this work, we start internalizing
this target, "getting money for reducing distortionary taxes", in the objective
function of the public management and we prove that this can be suﬃcient to
implement an economy performance superior to the one obtained by privati-
zation. This may be true even if the privatized-firm becomes eﬃcient as its
competitors (full eﬃcient privatization). This is true both in terms of welfare
and in terms of public firm’s profit.
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Moreover, when we analyze the issue of endogenous timing, while with
private-owned firms only simultaneous equilibria can be implemented, we prove
that sequential equilibria are part of the SPNE of the model. This property
enlarges the set of the parameters where the mixed oligopoly dominates the
full-eﬃcient privatization.
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